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In Smith v. Town of Vinton,39 plaintiff sought recovery for
work performed in repairing defendant's electrical system, pur-
suant to a verbal contract with the mayor. The court noted that
under the contract the making of repairs was merely incidental
to the principal undertaking of rebuilding the defendant's elec-
trical system at a cost of approximately $25,000. This being so,
the contract was void as a violation of the statute requiring
advertising and competitive bidding where the amount of the
public work exceeds $500. However, said the court, since the
transaction was malum prohibitum, not malum in se and since
no fraud was involved and the city received the benefits, plain-
tiff could recover for the actual cost of the materials under the
unjust enrichment theory of the civil law.
Strictly speaking, in allowing recovery for the actual cost of
the materials to the vendor, the court departed somewhat from
the unjust enrichment theory of the civil law. For in the civil
law, the amount recoverable under this theory "must not exceed
the enrichment of the defendant or the impoverishment of the
plaintiff," whichever is smaller.40 Very often, of course, the two
measures of damages produce the same result. Nevertheless,
language loosely interchanging the two measures may lead to an
erroneous choice in a case where a difference does exist.41
STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION
Charles A. Reynard*
State excises and local property taxes occupied the attention
of the court in four cases decided during the course of the term,
three of which involved constitutional issues of significance, state
or federal or both, but the result in none of them affects the
over-all tax structure of the taxing authorities involved.
Interstate Oil Pipe Line Company v. Guilbeau' was an
action in which the plaintiff, seeking to recover levee district
39. 216 La. 9, 43 So. 2d 18 (1949).
40. David, Unjustified Enrichment in French Law, 5 Camb. L.J. 205, 222
(1934); Rinfret, The Doctrine of Unjustified Enrichment in the Law of
Quebec, 15 Can. Bar Rev. 331 (1937).
41. The court also cited Article 1965 of the Revised Civil Code in support
of its decision. Although this article as interpreted would seem to support
the instant case, it should be noted that the interpretations of this article
vary in several respects from the unjust enrichment theory of the civil law.
See note 40, supra.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 217 La. 160, 46 So. 2d 113 1950).
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taxes which had been paid upon its land by its predecessor in
title, alleged that the taxes had been exacted in contravention
of the provisions of both state and federal constitutions. The
legislature created the levee district by Act 260 of 1938,2 in which
the general boundaries of the area are set forth in detail. There
follows, however, a proviso designed in general to exclude the
spillway area which would be inundated in the event of extreme
high waters; it reads:
"There shall be excluded from the limits of said levee district
the following: All that portion of St. Landry Parish lying
west of the Atchafalaya River main levee and east of the
west guide levee of the West Atchafalaya Floodway as now
established extending from Avoyelles Parish line on the
north to Bayou Courtableau on the south, with the excep-
tion of rights of way and other property belonging to rail-
roads, pipelines, common carriers or other public utilities."
The necessary effect of this proviso is, of course, to exclude from
the levee district, and the incidental taxes involved, all property
in the spillway area owned by persons other than "railroads, pipe-
lines, common carriers or other public utilities," and at the same
time to place all property held by these classes of taxpayers
within the district and to subject it to levee district taxes. Plain-
tiff, being a common carrier by pipe-line (like its predecessor in
title) was required to pay the tax, while adjoining non-public
utility owners were not. Upon the basis of this disparity of treat-
ment plaintiff contended that the legislature had violated the
uniformity of taxation and due process clauses of Article X,
Section 1, and Article I, Section 2, respectively, of the State Con-
stitution, as well as the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United
States. The supreme court affirmed the action of the trial judge,
sustaining the validity of the statute, and denied recovery of the
taxes, relying essentially upon the well-recognized doctrine that
in the exercise of the taxing power a legislature may turn to
classification without violating the principles of uniformity of
taxation or equal protection of the laws so long as it does not
resort to arbitrariness, whim or caprice.
The result seems wholly sound and correct, but it would
appear that the court mistook a due process issue for one of equal
protection. It is easily understood how the plaintiff's challenge
of the tax on the ground of uniformity led the court to treat the
2. La. R.S. (1950) 38:1351.
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case as one presenting simply and solely the issue of equal pro-
tection; and treating it thus, to dispose of it with relative ease.
The syllogistic process involved is merely this: Article X, Sec-
tion 1, of the State Constitution requires that "all taxes shall be
uniform upon the same class of subjects throughout the terri-
torial limits of the authority levying the tax;" but this limitation
does not forbid the legislature to classify subjects of taxation so
long as reasonable and substantial differences characterize the
subjects so taxed; public utilities of the class here involved are
reasonably different in character from other types of taxpayers-
at least to the extent that such classification cannot be said to be
arbitrary, whimsical or capricious; hence the tax thus imposed
is not vulnerable on the point of uniformity when tested by the
requirement of equal protection of the laws.
But it is submitted that this disposition of the controversy
completely mistakes the true issue which is involved. The tax
in this case was unquestionably uniform. It applied to taxpayers
of all classes throughout the levee district regardless of their
character, whether they be public utilities, farmers, merchants
or private home owners, so long as their property was included
within the taxing district. The true gravamen of the complaint,
therefore, was that the legislature had acted unconstitutionally
in creating the levee district by so extending it to include the
plaintiff's property. Viewed in this perspective, the issue is
simply whether the plaintiff's property has been taken without
due process of law. In applying this limitation to the action of
legislatures in fixing the boundaries of taxing districts, the courts
have accorded practical finality to legislative judgment. Begin-
ning in 1881 with the early case of County of Mobile v. Kimball,8
sustaining legislation assessing the entire cost of improving the
harbor of Mobile against the adjoining county rather than the
state as a whole, and continuing to the recent case of Chesebro v.
Los Angeles County Flood Control District,4 decided in 1939, the
Supreme Court of the United States has exhibited a marked ten-
dency to regard the legislative determination as conclusive in
the absence of flagrant abuse or purely arbitrary action against
the attack predicated upon the due process argument. In looking
to see whether there has been abuse or arbitrary action, the court
3. 102 U.S. 691 (1881).
4. 306 U.S. 459 (1939). For intervening landmark cases see Hagar v.
Reclamation Dist., Ill U.S. 701 (1884); Spencer v. Merchant, 125 U.S. 345(1888); Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269 (1898); French v. Barber Asphalt
Paving Co., 181 U.S. 324 (1901) and Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 239
U.S. 254 (1915).
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has been guided essentially by considerations of possible benefit
to be obtained by the complaining taxpayer from the project
undertaken by the legislation which imposes the tax.5 The court
in the instant case made such an inquiry and satisfied itself that
such benefits did in fact accrue to the plaintiff, but persisted,
however, in attributing the need for such inquiry to the demands
of equal protection,6 rather than due process of law. Fortunately
the tests for both limitations are practically the same, and so
tested, the result reached in the case was proper.
State ex rel. Fontenot, Collector of Revenue v. Standard
Dredging Corporation7 was an action to recover power taxes8
alleged to be due from the defendant who operated dredges in
the course of improving navigable waterways within the state
and who admittedly used power generated in these vessels for
the purpose of conducting these operations. The dredges re-
mained within the territorial limits of the state throughout the
entire taxable period involved. The defendant opposed the action
on two grounds; first, that having paid an occupational license
tax for the privilege of engaging in the business of contracting,
the attempt of the state to exact another tax in the form of the
power excise constituted double taxation; and second, that state
taxation of the operations involved constituted an interference
with the paramount jurisdiction of the United States in matters
of admiralty and interstate commerce.
One aspect of the assertion that the power tax constitutes
double taxation was disposed of in the recent case of State v.
5. For an interesting case, which arose in Louisiana, holding the inclu-
sion of an island within a drainage district on the mainland to be a denial of
due process of law, see Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia and St. M. Drainage Dist.,
239 U.S. 478 (1916).
6. "From the language of the proviso excluding a certain area from the
limits of the said levee district, it is apparent that the purpose was to relieve
from the burden of taxation as was otherwise required in the district, the
land and property situated in the West Atchafalaya Spillway basin and
which would derive no benefit from the levee system which the levee district
had to maintain. It is common knowledge that in the use which was to be
made of the spillway, lands and other property situated therein might well
be rendered valueless and would no longer derive the benefit intended under
the Act. However, in excluding the whole area, the legislature, in its wis-
dom, concluded that certain classes of property, such as that of railroads,
pipe-lines, common carriers or other public utilities would not suffer the
same fate, or at least not to the same extent as other property and therefore
all of that property should be made to bear the burden of taxation. That, in
our opinion, was a reasonable and legitimate exercise of its taxing power by
the legislature and was by no means so arbitrary as to make the classifica-
tion invalid and unconstitutional." 217 La. 160, 46 So. 2d 113, 116, 117 (1950).
7. 216 La. 509, 43 So. 2d 909 (1949).
8. Imposed by La. Act 25 of 1935 (2 E.S.) as amended, La. Act 5 of 1935
(4 E.S.) (La. R.S. [1950] 47:1151 et seq.).
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Triangle Drilling Company,9 reviewed in these pages last year,10
and the court, relying on that case among others, overruled the
defense, pointing out that the two taxes involved were separate
and distinct, each being exacted for the exercise of separate and
different privileges. Although it is sometimes loosely asserted
that a taxing authority which levies an occupational tax upon the
right to engage in a particular business is thereafter forbidden to
subdivide the business and impose additional taxes upon its con-
stituent elements"l-a proposition upon which the defendant
relied in part-there is serious doubt whether such a statement
is in accord with fundamental principles of the law of taxation.
In sustaining the taxing provisions of the Social Security Act, the
Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Jus-
tice Cardozo, has said, "The power to tax the activities and rela-
tions that constitute a calling considered as a unit is the power
to tax any of them. The whole includes the parts."'1 2 It is true,
of course, that the court was there concerned with the Act of
Congress in laying a tax on the employment relation, and no
general occupational tax upon the employer's business as a whole
had been imposed; nevertheless, it is submitted that ensuing
state unemployment compensation laws imposing similar taxes
(to obtain the advantages of the credit provisions of the federal
act) when imposed upon employers already subject to occupa-
tional license taxes would invite the same attack, but no such
assertion seems ever to have been made, or if so, sustained. In
any event, the principle asserted by the defendant, if applicable
at all, pertains only to those aspects of the business which are
essential parts of the business as a whole. Thus qualified, and
considered in the light of facts of the instant case, it is apparent
that the rule has no application here. Defendant was licensed
as a contractor under an occupational excise applicable to all con-
tractors in the state, and while it may be said that the use of
power producing machinery was a necessary element of its busi-
ness, this proposition could not be generalized to cover the busi-
nesses of all contractors, or even a substantial number of them.
Conversely, of course, the power tax is imposed upon all tax-
payers falling within its reach regardless of the type of business
in which they are engaged, whether it be contracting, mining,
manufacturing or other activity. Hence it is properly to be
9. 214 La. 273, 37 So. 2d 598 (1948).
10. The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1948-1949 Term,
10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 147 (1950).
11. 33 Am. Jur., Licenses, § 25.
12. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
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regarded as a separate and distinct tax, or as the statute imposing
it describes it, a tax "In addition to all other taxes of every kind
imposed by law"' 3 and hence not to be condemned as double
taxation, which contemplates the imposition of two taxes on the
same subject. Finally, in response to the defendant's claim based
upon the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, it
is appropriate to recall the famous utterance of Mr. Justice
Holmes that "The Fourteenth Amendment no more forbids double
taxation than it does doubling the amount of the tax, short of
confiscation or proceedings unconstitutional on other grounds.' 1 4
On the commerce point the defendant's objections to the
imposition of the tax were even less tenable. As long ago as 1905
the Supreme Court of the United States held that a state was
free to tax vessels which remained wholly within its territorial
jurisdiction throughout the taxable year, despite the fact that
the vessels thus taxed were engaged in interstate commerce and
were enrolled and licensed in the coastwide trade-under appro-
priate federal legislation.15 If it be thought material that the
Court in that case was considering a property rather than an
excise tax, the more recent case of Trinity Farm Construction
Company v. Grosjean'6 is a conclusive answer to defendant's
claim. In the latter case the court sustained the Louisiana excise
tax on gasoline consumed within the state by a contractor en-
gaged in the performance of a contract with the United States
for the construction of levees along the Mississippi River. In that
case, Mr. Justice Butler, speaking for a unanimous court, said:
"Unquestionably, as appellant here concedes, Louisiana is
free to tax the machinery, storage tanks, tools, etc., that are
used for the performance of the contracts. These things are
as closely connected with the works as is the gasoline in
respect of which is laid the excise in question. There is no
room for any distinction between the plant so employed and
the gasoline used to generate the power."' 7
Certainly it is to be presumed that if the state may impose an
excise on the fuel used as a source of power, as held in the
quoted case, it is equally free in the selection of taxable subjects,
to seize upon the use of machinery which is also the source of
13. Note 7, supra.
14. Fort Smith Lumber Co. v. Arkansas, 251 U.S. 532, 533 (1920).
15. Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 198 U.S. 299 (1905). See also
Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
16. 291 U.S. 466 (1934).
17. Id. at 472.
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power for the fulfillment of contracts of a strikingly similar
nature. The soundness of this presumption as well as that of
the decision would seem to be affirmed by the fact that the
Supreme Court of the United States dismissed a subsequent
appeal in the case "for want of a substantial federal question."' 8
A case of relatively minor significance, except to the parties
themselves, was Gulf Shipside Storage Corporation v. Thames,",
which was concerned solely with the determination of the effec-
tive date of Act 291 of 1948 changing the base factors upon
which experience-rating records are computed for determining
the rate of employer contributions under the Louisiana Unem-
ployment Compensation Law. 20 The answer to this burning
question, as supplied by the trial court and affirmed in the instant
case, was July 28, 1948, that date being "the twentieth day after
the Legislature . . . adjourned," as prescribed in Article III, Sec-
tion 27, of the State Constitution, and no different date being
designated in the enactment itself. The significance of this deter-
mination to the plaintiff, an employer required to contribute
payroll taxes, was that the rate of his contribution for the next
ensuing (and concluding) calendar quarter of the year was
reduced below that which he had been required to pay under
the pre-existing law. The defendant, Administrator of the Divi-
sion of Employment Security, Department of Labor, had con-
strued the amendment to be effective beginning with the calendar
year 1949 and had exacted taxes from the plaintiff under the old
rate for the quarter in question, thereby precipitating this action
for the recovery of the alleged overcharge. The court found
none of the various defenses urged by the defendant to be im-
pressive, 21 and the writer must confess to a similar lack of con-
viction. A variety of principles of statutory construction were
invoked and found to be either inapplicable because of the clear
and unambiguous language of the statute, or tending to defeat
rather than support defendant's contentions. Perhaps the most
serious objection to the plaintiff's claim was the extent to which
it resulted in administrative inconvenience-a ground strongly
urged by the defendant which the court found unacceptable.
Similar treatment has been accorded the argument of admin-
istrative inconvenience in other areas, where issues of mere
18. 94 L. Ed. 454, 70 S. Ct. 574 (1950).
19. Decided together with New Orleans Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Thames,
217 La. 128, 46 So. 2d 62 (1950).
20. La. Act 97 of 1936, as amended (La. R.S. [1950) 23:1471 et seq.).
21. 217 La. 128, 46 So. 2d 62, 64 (1950).
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statutory interpretation have been involved; 22 regardless of the
merits of such defense, it would seem unsound to allow it to
prevail over the positive terms of a constitutional provision such
as that involved here.
Di Giovanni v. Cortinas2" was last term's specimen of the
hardy perennial, the suit to annul tax deeds pursuant to the pro-
visions of Article X, Section 11, of the State Constitution. The
fact that it was successful, together with the fact that it has
added a new exception via construction to the literal wording of
the constitutional provision, emphasizes the need for reform in
this area which has been voiced repeatedly in the pages of this
REVIEW.24 The constitutional provision, so far as pertinent, reads
as follows:
"No sale of property for taxes shall be set aside for any cause,
except on proof of payment of the taxes for which the prop-
erty was sold prior to the date of the sale, unless the pro-
ceeding to annul is instituted within . .. five years from the
date of the recordation of the tax deed. .. ."
In the instant case the tax deeds were annuiled despite the facts
that (1) more than five years had elapsed since the filing of the
tax deed, (2) plaintiffs had not paid the taxes which prompted
the sale, and (3) in rendering two previous decisions in 193325
and 1940,26 the court had held that the plaintiffs did not even own
the land. It is thus obvious that the constitutional provision is
not taken to mean what it literally says.
The fact that the plaintiffs had retained corporeal possession
of the property following the tax sale was held to prevent the
running of the five-year period of peremption. As an original
proposition this might be regarded to be unwarranted by the
unambiguous language of the Constitution, but an unbroken line
22. See, e.g., Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 313
U.S. 177 (1941), where the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed an
order of the National Labor Relations Board directing both instatement and
reinstatement of employees with back pay. However, that portion of the
Board's order directing that the back pay be a sum equal to what the men
would have earned during the period involved in the unfair labor practice
was modified to authorize deductions of amounts which the workers "failed
without excuse to earn" over the objection of the Board that inquiry into
such matters would occasion administrative inconvenience.
23. 216 La. 687, 44 So. 2d 818 (1950).
24. Fordham and Hunter, Some Observations on the Louisiana Property
Tax Collectoin System, 7 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 459 (1947); The Work of the
Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1948-49 Term, 10 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 120,
148 (1950).
25. venta v. Ferrara, 177 La. 433, 148 So. 670 (1933).
26. venta v. Ferrara, 195 La. 334, 196 So. 550 (1940).
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of jurisprudence under the present as well as previous constitu-
tions containing similarly worded provisions has justified such
an interpretation as a demand of due process of law. The sound-
ness of this conclusion has been seriously questioned previously
in these pages .2  Having established their rights to challenge the
validity of the tax sale in this fashion, the plaintiffs were then
permitted to succeed by showing that the property had been
assessed and sold in the name of their father who had died some
ten years prior to the year of tax delinquency and without being
required to show any genuine prejudice. This is another aspect
of tax sale annullment which has been seriously questioneds.2
Finally, plaintiffs were allowed the relief requested despite the
fact that previous authoritative adjudications of the same court
had held that they did not in fact own the land in dispute, but
were, at best, possessors in good faith within the meaning of
Article 3451 of the Civil Code, title to the property having been
clearly determined to be vested in others. Justice McCaleb in a
dissent, in which he was joined by Justice LeBlanc, saw no valid
reason for the extension of the doctrine that peremption is sus-
pended by corporeal possession by the owner of the property.
The writer shares this view, particularly in view of the doubtful




For good or ill, exclusionary rules of evidence retain their
vitality in Louisiana criminal cases. Civil cases in which an evi-
dence point is raised on appeal are negligible. In the holdings
which follow, all criminal cases, no novel or startling problems
of evidence present themselves. But the decisions of the Louisi-
ana Supreme Court on evidence questions illustrate graphically
the judicial process ceaselessly at work in attempting to recon-
cile the irreconcilable demands of order for the community, and
liberty for the citizen.
27. Fordham and Hunter, supra note 23 at 464-467.
28. Id. at 468.
* Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
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